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ARTICLE
Japan’s Aspirations for Regional Leadership – Is the Goose
Finally Cooked?
Lindsay Black
Institute of Area Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Japan’s rise has often been conceived in terms of the ‘ﬂying geese’ model in which Japan led
a ﬂock of emerging East Asian economies as its production networks expanded and it shed
outdated technologies to the followers. Though the model implied a continuing Japanese
leadership role in the East Asian region, two lost decades have undermined Japan’s claim to
head the ﬂock of ‘ﬂying geese’ and Japan is often perceived as in decline relative to China’s
rapid rise. This paper challenges such accounts to argue that Japan still has signiﬁcant
leadership ambitions and, potentially, the means to bring them to fruition. Understanding
Japan’s leadership ambitions requires conceptualizing power in terms of discursive as well as
material resources. Doing so highlights how diﬀerent policymakers articulate contrasting
visions of how Japan should take the lead in East Asia. These visions are of Japan as (variously)
a functional leader, a conveyer of universal values, a conformist to ASEAN norms, a strategic
partner and a promoter of open regionalism. Whilst most analyses have focused on Japan as a
declining power, it is the spatial, temporal and ethical incompatibility of these regional visions
that undermines Japan’s aspirations to lead the East Asian region.
Introduction
Japan’s rise has often been conceived in terms of the ‘ﬂying geese’ model in which Japan
led a ﬂock of emerging economies in the East Asian region as its production networks
expanded and it shed outdated technologies to the followers. Though the model implied
a continuing Japanese leadership role in the East Asian region, two lost decades have
undermined Japan’s claim to head the ﬂock of ‘ﬂying geese’ and Japan is often perceived
as in decline relative to China’s rapid rise. Though the height of Japan’s material power
may have passed, it has signiﬁcant leadership ambitions and, potentially, the means to
bring them to fruition. Pessimistic accounts of Japan’s decline in the shadow of China’s
rise need ﬁrstly to re-evaluate the economic relationship of interdependence between
China and Japan to understand that China’s rise has been in Japan’s broader economic
interests. Secondly, these accounts need to reconsider how regional leadership and
power are deﬁned. Leadership in the East Asian region is often conceptualized as a
power play between its dominant states, namely the US, Japan, and China. Terada and
Yuzawa, for example, emphasize the importance of Japan’s material power in promot-
ing its preferred regional grouping, the East Asia Summit (EAS).1 They perceive Japan
as trying to counter the structural transformation engendered by China’s rise in terms
CONTACT Lindsay Black l.black@hum.leidenuniv.nl
1Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6’; Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community’, 5‒17; Yuzawa, ‘Higashi Ajia no
takokukan seido’, 10‒24; Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy.
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of its increased military spending and expanding GDP, relative to US decline, by
keeping the US engaged in the region.
Terada’s and Yuzawa’s work on the EAS focuses on a key aspect of Japan’s power,2
but interaction in the East Asian region is also based on social relations in which
foreign-policy actors articulate their visions for regional cooperation in an eﬀort to
convince their counterparts.3 The ways in which actors articulate Japan’s regional vision
are far from stable and coherent. A theoretical approach that emphasizes the con-
structed nature of discourse has to accept the inherent instability of that discourse.
Japan’s regional vision comprises spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions that are
incompatible with each other, making it diﬃcult for other actors in the region to accept
Japan as a leader. These dimensions comprise: the temporal disjuncture between Japan’s
future-orientated approach to regional relations and technological leadership that
emphasizes Japan’s post-war experience; the ethical discrepancies within Japan’s
approach to functional cooperation; the spatial incompatibility of Japan’s emphasis
on open regionalism and simultaneous pursuit of a closed regional policy encompassing
strategic partnerships; and inability to reconcile ethical positions based on both ‘uni-
versal’ and ‘Asian’ values. Second, the notion of a monolithic Japan that can maintain a
uniﬁed and coherent vision of regional cooperation has to be challenged. Japanese
foreign-policy actors articulate competing visions as they attempt to shape Japan’s
regional policy. Japan can only play a leadership role once the mutually incompatible
aspects of its regional policy have been addressed, and this entails managing competi-
tion between foreign-policy actors more eﬀectively and critically rethinking how actors
have constructed Japan’s self-identity.
This article begins with an overview of Japan’s regional policy that emphasizes the
centrality of material factors. It then develops a theoretical framework based on both
normative factors and the role of foreign-policy makers. In doing so, the argument
highlights both the instability of foreign-policy discourses across spatial, temporal and
ethical dimensions and the competition between bureaucratic actors in the making of
Japan’s regional policy.
Japan’s Regional Policy and the East Asia Summit (EAS)
Since the end of the Cold War, China’s economic development and expanding military
budget have presented a challenge to Japanese attempts to lead the East Asian region.
For Terada, the emergence of China as a regional power has transformed the structure
of East Asian international relations, necessitating that Japan balance against China’s
rise.4 Japan has done so by maintaining its bilateral alliance with the US and keeping
the US engaged in regional multilateral fora, most recently through encouraging US
participation in the EAS. The EAS is a particularly attractive forum for Japanese
policymakers to keep the US locked into regional politics due to its open membership
and strategic focus, as well as its embrace of a wide range of issues.5 Prior to the
2Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community’; Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6’; Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy; Yuzawa,
‘Higashi Ajia no takokukan seido’.
3Nabers, ‘Power, Leadership, and Hegemony’.
4Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6’.
5Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy; Yuzawa, ‘Higashi Ajia no takokukan seido’.
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inauguration of the EAS in 2005, Japanese policymakers had sought to keep the US
engaged through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), in terms of security, and the Asia
Paciﬁc Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, in terms of economics.6 Japan’s use of
these fora diminished as ARF failed to make progress on preventative diplomacy,7 and
APEC became divided over the Bogor Initiative and Early Voluntary Sector
Liberalization (EVSL), resulting in a loss of US interest in East Asian multilateral
eﬀorts.8 In the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the ASEAN Plus Three
(APT) emerged as the core East Asian forum and the conﬂicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq became the focus of the Bush administration. The US lack of commitment to East
Asian regionalism was further demonstrated by the failure of Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice to attend the 2005 and 2007 ARF meetings.9
With the US becoming estranged from multilateral eﬀorts, the Japanese government
sought new ways to keep the US engaged in the East Asian region. In 2002, Prime
Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō articulated his vision for an East Asian Community (EAC)
that would demonstrate the Japanese government’s preference for open regionalism, the
US as the regional security guarantor, and functional cooperation.10 From the Japanese
perspective, this functional cooperation would be based on non-traditional security and
economic development and would encompass a variety of issue areas such as health
care, environmental eﬀorts, ﬁnancial coordination, and anti-piracy eﬀorts. The central
idea was that functional cooperation in one issue area would spill over into new areas,
necessitating the construction of institutions and fostering a regional identity.11
Koizumi’s speech gained the support of both Singapore and Thailand, which, like
Japan, were eager to counter China’s increasing dominance in the APT.12 Chinese
oﬃcials in turn backed the closed regional grouping of the APT and emphasized
sovereignty and non-intervention as core regional norms and potential strategic rivalry
with the US over the long term.13 The December 2005 EAS declaration appeared to
oﬀer a compromise solution which stated that although the APT would continue to
function as the ‘main vehicle’ for integration, the EAS ‘could play a signiﬁcant role in
community building’.14 In reality, the ambiguous phrasing still left the door open to the
EAS replacing the APT as the East Asian region’s core forum, as Prime Minister
Koizumi stressed in his speech.15
As a result of Sino-Japanese competition, ASEAN initially took the lead within the
EAS, undermining the extent to which the forum could institutionalize rules or gen-
erate innovative policies.16 Until 2011, ASEAN set the EAS agenda, determined mem-
bership, and acted as a mediator between the great powers.17 In its ﬁrst ﬁve years, the
6Yuzawa, ‘Higashi Ajia no takokukan seido’, 13‒14.
7Yuzawa, Japan’s Security Policy.
8Pempel, ‘How Bush Bungled Asia’.
9Yuzawa, ‘Higashi Ajia no takokukan seido’, 14‒15.
10Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community’.
11MOFA, Issue papers; Sohn, ‘Japan’s New Regionalism’.
12Sohn, ‘Japan’s New Regionalism’, 9.
13Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community’; Soeya, ‘An East Asian Community’; An, ‘Higashi Ajia’, 10‒11.
14MOFA, ‘Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi Attends the EAS’.
15Ibid.
16Emmers, Liow and Tan, ‘The East Asia Summit’, 26, 28‒29; Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community’, 9; Foot, ‘Asia’s
Cooperation and Governance’, 137.
17Prakash, ‘Will the US Commit’; Wihardja, ‘The Sixth East Asia Summit’.
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EAS mostly focused on economic issues such as energy cooperation, nuclear safety
guidelines, food safety, education, and disaster management.18 The summit itself
comprised only a couple of two hour meetings, allowing for limited frank discussion
even on this small range of mostly uncontroversial issues.19 With the inclusion of the
US and Russia in 2011, however, the EAS was able to shift gears and ﬁnally move
forward on strategic issues, with the Obama administration perceiving the EAS as an
additional East Asian forum to counter China’s rise.20 Joining the EAS was a corner-
stone in President Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’, demonstrating an eagerness to engage with
ASEAN-led regional fora.21 Together with Japan, most ASEAN states have welcomed
the US in the EAS as an eﬀective counter-weight to China. The Obama administration
quickly demonstrated its intention to challenge China’s inﬂuence in the EAS by backing
the inclusion of the South China Sea dispute in the sixth EAS meeting agenda.22 At the
same time, welcoming the US into the EAS has brought the US and Japanese diﬀerences
on regional trade and ﬁnancial issues into sharp relief.23
In promoting the EAS as a means to balance against China’s rise in a changing East
Asian structure, Japan has achieved a key foreign-policy goal.24 At the same time, by
failing to reconcile with China’s regional approach, Japan has ceded regional leadership
ﬁrst to ASEAN and then to the US.25 Understanding why Japanese foreign-policymakers
have been unable to exercise leadership in the East Asian region requires a consideration
of the discursive dimensions of the contending regional visions articulated by Japan’s
policymaking community.
The Discursive Dimensions of Regional Leadership in East Asia
When assessing accounts of regional leadership in East Asia, Dent argues that it is
important not to focus simply on West-centric IR theories that uncritically accept the
state as an actor and emphasize only material power.26 Instead, understanding leader-
ship requires also analyzing social or ideational power as it is exercised by a myriad of
actors at diﬀerent levels of analysis.27 Nabers develops Dent’s approach by drawing on
Lukes’ three dimensions of power, namely: the ability to coerce other actors into doing
what they otherwise would not; a covert aspect in which actors set agendas; and the
shaping of other actors’ desires.28 The last of these dimensions is discursive and
includes how actors are socialized to behave, as well as how they accept certain
approaches as ‘common sense’ and internalize them.29 By bringing in Lukes’ work,
Nabers draws attention to the importance of how actors relate to each other within
18Wihardja, ‘The Sixth East Asia Summit’; Tanaka, ‘Consolidating East Asian Cooperation’.
19Wihardja, ‘The Sixth East Asia Summit’.
20Ibid.; Prakash, ‘Will the US Commit’; Capie and Acharya, ‘The United States and the East Asia Summit’.
21Capie and Acharya, ‘The United States and the East Asia Summit’; Kassim, ‘East Asia Summit 2012’; Terada, ‘Japan’s
Asian Policy Strategy’, 227‒29.
22Prakash, ‘Will the US Commit’; Kassim, ‘East Asia Summit 2012‘.
23Capie and Acharya, ‘The United States and the East Asia Summit’; Kassim, ‘East Asia Summit 2012‘; Pakpahan, ‘ASEAN:
Regional Stabiliser’.
24Terada, ‘Forming an East Asian Community’; Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6’.
25Cumings, ‘The History and Practice of Unilateralism’; Terada, ‘Japan’s Asian Policy Strategy’, 227‒28.
26Dent, China, Japan and Regional Leadership, 276‒81.
27Ibid., 287.
28Nabers, ‘Power, Leadership, and Hegemony’, 933‒34; Lukes, Power: A Radical View.
29Nabers, ‘Power, Leadership, and Hegemony’, 932.
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structural contexts that frame how these actors employ the material and social power
resources at their disposal.30 At the same time, Nabers draws the discussion away from
structure and towards agency by exploring how states articulate a speciﬁc worldview
that their peers in the region come to accept as hegemonic, by which he ‘means nothing
more than the discursive struggle between political actors over the assertion of their
particular representations of the world as having a universal signiﬁcance’.31 In terms of
East Asian regionalism, this discursive struggle can be conceptualized as between
China’s embrace of the closed regional model of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) and
Japan’s preference for the open regional model of the East Asia Summit (EAS) that
developed in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis.
Nabers’ contribution is important for its emphasis on how states discursively frame
their visions of regional cooperation and integration in a bid for regional leadership.
Nabers’ analysis does raise three further issues that also need to be addressed, however.
First, a discursive approach to regional leadership needs to provide a clear account of
the basis upon which a regional vision has been constructed.32 Second, a theoretical
approach that emphasizes the constructed nature of discourse has to accept the inherent
instability of that discourse. Japan’s regional visions contain aspects that are incompa-
tible with each other, making it diﬃcult for other actors in the region to accept and
internalize Japan’s worldview as their own. Finally, Nabers’ state-centric approach
ignores how and why foreign-policy makers articulate alternative approaches to regio-
nal leadership.33 Capturing these three dimensions results in a more nuanced under-
standing of the possibilities and limitations of Japan’s regional leadership ambitions.
A discursive approach to understanding a state’s regional leadership vision needs to
ascertain the basis upon which that vision has been constructed. Foreign-policy actors can
generate innovative foreign policies, but they do so within a given framework of action.
Foreign-policy makers must be attuned to what will be accepted at both the domestic and
regional levels. On the one hand, this requires an understanding of the norms that guide
conduct between actors at the regional level.34 Actors operating within East Asian
institutions have to abide by the ASEAN norms of consensus-building, non-
intervention, non-use of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and regional solutions to
regional problems,35 or risk being excluded from the community.36 On the other hand, at
the domestic level actors must abide by accepted understandings of their state’s self-
identity. Actors construct their state’s identity based on ‘a collective understanding of
how to understand the past, situate the present and act toward the future’.37 At the same
time, a state’s identity is always juxtaposed against a certain referent, meaning an ‘other’
that comprises the negative image of the state.38 This ‘other’ need not be another state,
but can reﬂect how actors perceive their state or region being diﬀerent today when
compared with its past. This was the case in Europe, where a constructed notion of
30Ibid., 935‒36.
31Ibid., 940.
32Hansen, Security as Practice, 9‒11.
33Terada, ‘The Origins of ASEAN+6’, 73.
34Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of it’, 136; Finnemore, National Interests in International Society, 1–29.
35Acharya, Constructing a Security Community.
36Johnston, ‘Socialization in International Institutions’.
37Barnett, ‘Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy’, 8.
38Campbell, Writing Security.
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community was juxtaposed against the region’s brutal history of conﬂict and genocide.39
Abiding by their constructed state identity enables actors to fortify their sense of
ontological security within a given international environment and they will therefore
tend to reject policy options that oppose their constructed state identity.40
As actors choose to accentuate certain referents whilst suppressing others, an actor’s
self-identity is not stable but rather infused with inherent contradictions.41 These
contradictions can be exposed through an analysis of foreign-policy discourses.
Speciﬁcally, the analyst seeks to understand how actors construct their self-identity in
relation to an ‘other’ in accordance with spatial, temporal and ethical dimensions.42 In
the case of Japan’s regional policy, foreign-policy makers demarcate those who are
included and accepted as regional players (spatiality), advance alternative ways of
thinking about the past, present and future (temporality), and set out what actors
should do and how they should act (ethicality). These spatial, temporal, and ethical
dimensions can shift and engender new contradictions as foreign-policy makers articu-
late new roles for themselves within the East Asian region.
Finally, a discursive approach to understanding regional leadership needs to question
the extent to which actors share a common foreign-policy vision by examining the foreign-
policymaking process. Of the three dominant models of Japan’s foreign-policymaking
process, namely the strategic, adaptive and reactive state models, both the strategic and
adaptive models emphasize a high degree of consensus amongst foreign-policy elites.43 The
notion of consensus amongst Japan’s foreign-policy elite has been reinforced by Shinoda’s
contention that the strengthening of the Kantei (Cabinet Secretariat) during the Koizumi
administration allowed prime ministers to overcome bureaucratic rivalries and enact more
coherent foreign policies.44 By emphasizing agreement between foreign-policy actors, both
the strategic and adaptive state models align with Nabers’ interpretation of Japan’s regional
leadership ambitions being understood in terms of a single worldview.
In contrast to the strategic and adaptive state models, the reactive model stresses that a
lack of leadership, combined with bureaucratic rivalries, undermines the Japanese gov-
ernment’s ability to execute proactive and consistent foreign policies. Instead, Japanese
governments react to foreign pressure, in particular pressure from the US (beiatsu).45
Inoguchi and Jain extend this model to assert that Japan is engaged in ‘karaoke diplo-
macy’, whereby the US chooses the policy for Japanese policymakers to implement.46 The
reactive state and karaoke models exaggerate the extent to which beiatsu drives Japan’s
foreign-policymaking process. It is therefore more accurate to consider the US oﬃcials
who apply pressure on Japan as an additional actor in a competitive foreign-policymaking
environment rather than beiatsu being the deﬁnitive factor. The next step is to consider
how each of these foreign-policy rivals advances a policy preference based on a speciﬁc
worldview that competes with others favored by their peers.
39Wæver, ‘European Security Identities’.
40Steele, ‘Ontological Security’.
41Hansen, Security as Practice, 20‒21.
42Ibid., 38‒41, 46‒51.
43Berger, ‘The Pragmatic Liberalism’, 267‒68. For a classic account of the strategic state model, see Johnson, MITI and
the Japanese Miracle.
44Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy.
45Calder, ‘Japanese Foreign Economic Policy’; Calder, ‘Asia’s Shifting Strategic Landscape’.
46Inoguchi and Jain, ‘Introduction’.
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Ashizawa demonstrates how foreign-policy actors promote policy preferences based on
their understanding of what their state is or represents. According to her value action frame-
work, ‘a conception of state identity provides policymakers with a particular value, which
sometimes becomes the dominant value, and hence, deﬁnes the preference of state foreign
policy’.47 Implicit in her framework is the notion that speciﬁc values may be embodied in a
particular government agency and that actors compete to have their preferred value dominate
a policy debate.48 Her research on the ARF and APEC, however, suggests that actors are
agreed on the dominant values from the outset. In their promotion of the APEC forum,
Ashizawa maintains that both MOFA (Foreign Aﬀairs) and MITI (International Trade and
Industry) oﬃcials set out to reassure their Asian neighbors whilst locking the US into the
process of East Asian regionalism.49 According to Krauss, however, MOFA oﬃcials down-
played Japan’s role in the establishment of APEC due to turf battles with MITI. Speciﬁcally,
MOFA oﬃcials looked to rein in MITI’s enthusiasm for regional economic cooperation by
emphasizing the potential backlash fromEast Asian states, whomight view Japanese eﬀorts as
threatening, and the US, which might be alarmed by Japan’s independent approach.50 As
Inoguchi notes, MOFA and the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI), MITI’s
successor following its reorganization in 2001, continue to push alternative regional proposals,
with MOFA focusing on open regionalism encompassing the Asia-Paciﬁc region and ‘uni-
versal values’, whilst METI emphasizes bilateral economic partnership agreements within the
East Asian region.51
Rather than expect that Japanese foreign-policy makers will always agree on a speciﬁc
regional vision, it is necessary to consider how the objectives and institutional histories of
diﬀerent government ministries and organizations shape their employees’ vision of Japan’s
regional role.52 In addition, as Japanese foreign-policy makers articulate competing visions of
regional cooperation, so the generation of a coherent regional policy can be undermined. In
Japan’s case a number of discursive fault lines can be detected. First, there is a disjuncture
between emphasizing a future-orientated approach to regional relations and technological
leadership that relies on a selective understanding of Japan’s past. Second, Japanese foreign-
policymakers stress functional cooperation whilst rejecting Chinese initiatives. Third, Japan’s
open regional approach based on 'universal values' contradicts its pursuit of a closed regional
policy encompassing strategic partnerships. Finally, Japanese foreign-policy makers are
unable to reconcile ‘universal’ and ‘Asian values’ in their regional policy.
Temporality: Japan’s ‘Future-orientated’ Approach and Technological
Leadership
Japanese regional leadership ambitions are undermined by a sense of ontological insecurity
stemming from Japan’s defeat inWorldWar Two and failure to address its past in the eyes of
47Ashizawa, ‘When Identity Matters’, 581.
48Ibid., 579, 582.
49Ibid., 585‒91.
50Krauss, ‘Japan and the US’, 479‒80, 483. See also Terada, ‘The Origins of Japan’s APEC Policy’, 345‒46; Ōga, ‘Hirakareta
chiikishugi’, 135‒37.
51Inoguchi, ‘Japanese Ideas of Asian Regionalism’, 243‒44. Competition is not of course guaranteed. For example, both
MOFA and METI promoted the formation of the EAS despite their diﬀerences and tensions between them. Terada,
‘The Origins of ASEAN+6’, 78‒81.
52Inoguchi, ‘Japanese Ideas of Asian Regionalism’.
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its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea.53 On the one hand, MOFA has sought to
reassure Japan’s neighbors about its regional role, as in the case of APEC.54 On the other
hand, MOFA has attempted to sideline historical issues centering on Japanese imperialism
from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century by simultaneously emphasizing Japan’s
contributions to building an East Asian community whilst advocating a ‘future-orientated’
policy.55 Such attempts have consistently failed to woo Japan’s neighbors as Japanese
politicians continue to pander to nationalist sentiments in a bid to gain popular support56
(a practice that is also prevalent in China and South Korea57). Both Chinese and South
Korean oﬃcials perceived Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the controversial Yasukuni
Shrine, where a number of Japanese war criminals are commemorated, as undermining the
trend towards closer regional ties. Similarly, Japanese eﬀorts to misrepresent its past aggres-
sion, including through the publication of patriotic history textbooks and the denial of state
involvement in the operation of ‘comfort stations’ (a euphemism formilitary brothels) during
World War Two, has raised the ire of Japan’s immediate neighbors. Despite engaging China
on diplomatic and economic fronts,58 Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine
on 26 December 2013 further strained political ties between Tokyo and Beijing and demon-
strated the continued appeal of playing the nationalist card in Japanese politics.59 Subsequent
events and statements failed to engender further reconciliation in East Asia. Chinese and
South Korean oﬃcials and media critiqued Abe’s statement on the seventieth anniversary of
World War Two. In addition, Abe’s appointment of nationalist and historical revisionist
politicians to his cabinet, such as Defense Minister Inada Tomomi, the Japanese govern-
ment’s response to statues commemorating the ‘comfort women’, as well as the Moritomo
Gakuen scandal, involving a dodgy land deal to a right-wing private education company with
ties to Abe and his wife,60 are among the many issues that continue to cast doubt on the
sincerity of the Abe administration to address Japan’s imperialist past squarely.
The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government under Prime Minster Hatoyama
Yukio (16 September 2009 - 8 June 2010) took steps to address tensions with China and
South Korea over Japan’s past. Nevertheless, even Hatoyama failed to confront these
history issues head-on. In a well-publicized speech in November 2009 following the
APEC leaders’ summit in Singapore, he stated, ‘reconciliation in the real sense of the
word is not necessarily believed to have been achieved in the region. This is the current
situation, although more than 60 years have passed since Japan caused tremendous
damage and suﬀering to the people of many countries, particularly on the people of
Asian nations’.61 Hatoyama’s use of the passive in the convoluted ﬁrst sentence conceals
any sense of agency or recognition of Japan’s neighbors’ concerns about how Japanese
actors have addressed their past. The second sentence stresses the passage of time,
‘more than 60 years have passed’, and combines with the subsequent paragraph in his
speech to elucidate how East Asian states should follow the example of France and
53Ibid., 234‒36.
54Ashizawa, ‘When Identity Matters’; Krauss, ‘Japan and the US’.
55MOFA, ‘Basic Position of the Government’; Koizumi, ‘Press Conference Following the APEC Leaders’ Meeting’; Koizumi,
‘Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’; Asō, ‘Asian Strategy’.
56Lind, Sorry States; Suzuki, ‘The Importance of “Othering”’.
57Lind, Sorry States; Zhao, A Nation-state by Construction.
58Hemmings and Kuroki, ‘Tokyo Trade-Oﬀs’, 60‒64.
59McCurry, ‘Chinese Ambassador Blasts Japanese PM’.
60Dudden, ‘Abe Caught Out’.
61Hatoyama, ‘Japan’s New Commitment to Asia’. See also Sahashi, ‘Hatoyama Yukio seiken’.
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Germany in overcoming their pasts.62 What Hatoyama’s speech missed was that
Franco-German reconciliation succeeded not least because politicians in both states
took steps to jointly confront their shared history and marginalize right-wing views,
unlike the contemporary situation in East Asia.63
There were also structural factors favoring European regionalism after World War Two
that were not present in East Asia at the time.Whereas theUS granted substantial aid through
theMarshall Plan and encouraged reconciliation in Europe to counter the threat of the Soviet
Union, in East Asia, American oﬃcials opted for a hub-and-spokes system of alliances that
inhibited multilateral collaboration and regional institution-building.64 As part of this pro-
cess, US administrations in South Korea and Japan sought to bury contentious history issues
in the name of national unity with the onset of the Cold War rather than promote an open
reappraisal of Japanese imperialism.65 East Asian governments also endorsed interpretations
of history that served their political interests after World War Two, rather than encourage a
more conciliatory approach.66 In addition, economic interdependence in Europe, supported
by the US, preceded eﬀorts that led to the creation of a joint history textbook, remembrance
ceremonies jointly attended by French and German leaders, and other eﬀorts to address the
past.67 Recognizing these historical and structural factors is necessary if East Asian leaders are
to promote reconciliation and further regional cooperation.
The lack of trust between the three dominant northeast Asian powers has inhibited the
development of grand regional projects.68 Instead, Japanese policymakers have promoted
Japan as the region’s technological leader and continued to focus on functionalist approaches
to spur regional cooperation.69 The notion of Japan as a technological leader is based on a
temporal rationale that clashes with its ‘future-orientated’ approach to regional relations.
Instead of looking forward, Japanese primeministers have repeatedly asked East Asian people
to reﬂect upon Japan’s peaceful economic rise in the post-WorldWar Two period and Japan’s
contribution to the development of the East Asian region.70 Japan’s contribution is phrased in
favorable terms, overlooking any negative impact that Japan’s regional economic expansion
has had on the environment or workers.71 From a temporal perspective, Japanese policy-
makers perceive their country’s technological leadership as emerging since 1945, ignoring
that the foundations for Japan’s technological advances were laid during the pre-war era.72
Ethicality: Functional Cooperation and Debating the AIIB
Given Japan’s self-projection as a technological leader that embraces functional cooperation, it
should welcome similar cooperative initiatives of other states and the opportunity these bring
for Japan to impart its wisdom based on its postwar experiences. Though numerous regional
62Ibid.
63Lind, Sorry States.
64Cumings, ‘The History and Practice of Unilateralism’, 41.
65Dudden, Troubled Apologies.
66He, ‘Remembering and Forgetting the War’.
67Berger, ‘Dealing with Diﬃcult Pasts’.
68Dent, China, Japan and Regional Leadership, 21‒22; Sohn, ‘Japan’s New Regionalism’.
69Inoguchi, ‘Japanese Ideas of Asian Regionalism’, 236, 240‒41; Dent, China, Japan and Regional Leadership; MOFA,
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institutions have been created in East Asia to tackle an array of problems, the failure of
northeast Asian states to squarely face and reconcile their violent pasts has led to these
institutions becoming sites of competition rather than of building cooperation and forging
a common regional identity. Both ﬁnancial cooperation through the establishment of the
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralized (CMIM) and the construction of Free Trade
Agreements (FTAs) have been stymied by Sino-Japanese rivalry.73 Rather than functional
cooperation providing a means of ameliorating Sino-Japanese relations that have soured
because of diﬀering interpretations of the past, functional regionalism has often worsened
bilateral ties.
A similar example of Sino-Japanese rivalry can be found in Japan’s rejection of China’s
proposal for an Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2013. Japan’s oﬃcial
position is that it will not join the AIIB because Chinese oﬃcials have not answered Japanese
concerns about the AIIB conducting its aﬀairs transparently, in accordance with good
governance practices and with debt sustainability in mind.74 The Japanese government has
also been fearful that the AIIB will challenge the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that Japan
has dominated since its creation.75 More vociferous critiques can be found in Japan’s popular
news journals, which depict the AIIB as a ‘Chinese plot’ designed to expand China’s
economic sphere of inﬂuence and geostrategic dominance in the Asian region, noting its
state-centric developmental approach, opaque governance structure, concealment of the
weaknesses of China’s economic system, and its failure to embrace the neoliberal order.76
These critiques have been echoed by former diplomat Nogami Yoshiji, chairman of the Japan
Institute of International Aﬀairs (JIIA), who has stated, ‘the AIIB is indicative of Xi Jinping’s
dream of China replacing both the US and Japan as Asia’s leader’.77 In other words, Japanese
policymakers have demarcated the ethically acceptable boundaries of China’s AIIB initiative.
They have done so in order to restate Japan’s economic rise as benevolent and its contribution
to regional development through functional cooperation as a technological leader. What is
striking about Japan’s critique of the AIIB is that many similar attacks were leveled at Japan’s
Oﬃcial Development Assistance (ODA) policy during the 1990s.78
Japan’s relations with the US, which has also adopted a critical stance towards the AIIB,
inﬂuenced Japan’s position; the Obama administration actively lobbied its allies not to join.
US eﬀorts were mostly unsuccessful, as a succession of countries followed the UK’s lead in
signing up to the AIIB before the 31 March 2015 deadline.79 In contrast, Japan remained
loyal to the US position and was critical of those countries that had joined,80 in part because
of the centrality of the US–Japan alliance in Japan’s foreign-policy, but also because of
timing relative to Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Washington in April 2015. Ultimately, the
US and Japanese approach to the AIIB has been seen as a failure of economic diplomacy,
with both Kantei andMinistry of Finance (MOF) oﬃcials stating that tying Japan’s policy to
the US over the AIIB had been a strategic mistake.81 This mistake was compounded by the
73Terada, ‘Japan’s Asian Policy’, 246‒48; Dent, ‘Free-trade Agreements’, 236.
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suspension of formal Sino-Japanese ﬁnancial dialogue as Sino-Japanese relations deterio-
rated after the Noda administration purchased the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2012 and
Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013.82 A lack of reconciliation
over historical issues hindered the possibility of more open Sino-Japanese discussions over
the AIIB.
In addition, Japan’s response to China’s AIIB highlighted tensions within Japan’s
foreign-policymaking community and the diﬃculty of articulating a coherent and
uniﬁed regional approach. Notably, MOF oﬃcials and Japanese business executives
were more positive than MOFA about the creation of the AIIB, as they anticipated
opportunities for Japanese ﬁrms and understood the AIIB as being in line with regional
approaches to development.83 In an MOF report, Ohashi Hideo clearly articulates the
Ministry’s position vis-à-vis the bank:
The AIIB would provide an opportunity for China to play a positive role in establishing
international economic order and rules. It also would indirectly support Chinese busi-
nesses in developing their new markets with vast demand for infrastructure improvement
in neighboring countries … [China] is strengthening its positive commitments to multi-
lateral international economic relations.84
From the start of 2015, MOF oﬃcials were in close contact with both China and the US,
negotiating the criteria for joining the AIIB with the Chinese side and countering US pressure
not to participate.85 Finance Minister Asō Tarō argued that if the Japanese government
received guarantees that investment standards would be upheld and governance would be
transparent, ‘we could quickly enter into a discussion on the possibilities of cooperation
regarding the amount Japan would invest [in the AIIB].86 Both Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga
Yoshihide and ForeignMinister Kishida Fumio quickly sought to correct Asō’s assertion.87 A
2012 ADB report had already conceded that it could not meet the burgeoning demand for
infrastructure in Asia88 and ADB President Takao Takehiko noted that he understood the
need for an institution like the AIIB and stressed the need to ﬁnd ways to cooperate with it.89
Considering MOF’s close ties to the ADB,90 it is striking that MOF oﬃcials have supported
the AIIB when the oﬃcial Japanese position was that the two banks might not be compatible.
The divisions here are on ideological lines, with MOF preferring a proactive approach to
regionalism focused on development and capacity-building, while the MOFA approach has
been US-centric and embraces neoliberal economic values.91
Spatiality: ‘Universal Values’, Strategic Partnerships and Open Regionalism
Neoliberal economic values, combined with democratization, human rights and rule of
law, comprise the ‘universal values’ that a number of Japanese policymakers have
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embraced to promote an open regional community. The EAS, with its broad member-
ship that incorporates fellow democracies such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, and
India, is perhaps the ideal regional forum for Japan to promote these ‘universal values’
and counter the Chinese approach based on the APT and closed regionalism.92 In doing
so, Japanese policymakers portray Japan as a bridge between East and West that can
convey these ‘universal values’ to East Asian states.93
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders have gone further, by portraying China’s
economic rise and perceived assertiveness in the East and South China Seas as a threat;
they have promoted Japan as a leader and the key to regional stability.94 Former foreign
minister and prime minister Asō Tarō’s ‘Arc of Freedom and Stability’95 and Abe’s ‘value
diplomacy’ and ‘democratic security diamond’96 are widely regarded as the soft power
component of Japan’s China containment strategy.97 In addition, Japanese leaders
together with the Ministry of Defense (MOD) have sought to counter China’s rise by
developing Japan’s international security role.98 Abe has repeatedly emphasized the need
for Japan to become a ‘normal’ nation that actively contributes to international security
issues through the development of its military forces and has sought to reinterpret the
Japanese constitution to allow for collective self-defense.99 In terms of Japan’s regional
leadership ambitions, this discourse serves to emphasize Japan’s benevolent strategic
objectives by questioning Chinese regional motives. Japanese policymakers have played
down Japan’s imperialist past by promoting a ‘future-orientated’ approach to regional-
ism, and Abe has consciously promoted Japanese nationalism in order to develop Japan’s
security policy.100 If anything, ‘universal values’ further serve to conceal Japan’s historical
aggression against its neighbors.
The Abe administration has also emphasized ‘universal values’ and a ‘democratic
security diamond’ to develop a regional security strategy based on fostering new
strategic partnerships with East Asian states. The Abe government strengthened its
strategic links with Australia in December 2012 and India in January 2014,101 as well as
with ASEAN states such as the Philippines and Vietnam.102 In many ways, Abe’s eﬀorts
mirror those of previous administrations, including under the DPJ, to forge strategic
ties to other states.103 For example, in the sphere of maritime security, Japan continues
to focus on developing coast guard authorities throughout Southeast Asia based on the
Japan Coast Guard model.104 Japan’s evolving strategic partnerships under Abe also
incorporate military exchanges and agreements on use of military facilities,105 as well as
92Inoguchi, ‘Japanese Ideas of Asian Regionalism’, 239, 243; Ōga, ‘Hirakareta chiikishugi’, 141; Camroux, ‘Regionalism in
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speciﬁcally identifying China’s attempts to ‘change the status quo’ through ‘large-scale
land reclamation and building of outposts’ on disputed territory in the South China
Sea.106 Unlike previous partnerships, therefore, Abe’s approach goes beyond functional
regional cooperation and ‘soft containment’107 to an ‘overt containment’ policy
designed to counter what the administration perceives as China’s assertive moves in
the East and South China Seas. Japan’s strategic partnerships are also a form of closed
rather than open regionalism that characterizes Japan’s approach to functional coopera-
tion in other issues areas, such as ﬁnance and trade,108 underscoring the incompatibility
of these approaches in terms of spatiality.
Ethicality: ‘Universal’ or ‘Asian’ Values?
At the same time as promoting these ‘universal values’, Japanese actors have also
emphasized the importance of working within the normative framework of the East
Asian region. In a speech delivered on 19 January 2016, Prime Minister Abe stated that,
‘[in the latter half of the twentieth century] we could say the values of freedom,
democracy, and the rule of law were “universal” among the peoples of Asia and
Africa in the true sense’.109 He then qualiﬁed this statement by adding, ‘Asia’s democ-
racy has a distinct mark engraved in it from ancient times, reﬂecting the values we have
held dear for generations’.110 By attempting to reconcile ‘Asian’ and ‘universal’ values
Abe stretches the meaning of both until they become empty, allowing the intended
audience to interpret his words as they wish. Similarly, Abe has sought to reassure
ASEAN members that Japan remains committed to the Fukuda Doctrine, which has
been the foundation for peaceful Japan-ASEAN relations since 1977. He therefore
stated that Japan would ‘never become a military power’, in spite of his ambitions for
Japan to become a ‘normal’ nation and his pursuit of militarized strategic partnerships,
which he has justiﬁed in terms of Japan’s commitment to ‘universal’ values.111
This confusing blend of ‘Asian’ and ‘universal’ values predates the current Abe adminis-
tration. Sohn notes that PrimeMinister Koizumi stressed both Asian values and traditions as
well as universal values in his 2003 Tokyo Declaration proposing the establishment of an East
Asian Community.112 Koizumi’s statement mirrored MOFA’s Issue Papers which also
emphasized the ‘creation of shared identity based on common values and principles’.113
The MOFA Issue Papers interpreted these common values and principles as ‘an East Asian
community which is outward looking, endowedwith exuberance of creativity and vitality and
with the shared spirit of mutual understanding and upholding Asian traditions and values,
while respecting universal rules and principles’.114 Ultimately, there is little sense of what East
Asia’s ‘shared identity’ is. TheMOFA Issue Papers conclude that ‘at present, we have no clear
answers…we need to continue our strenuous search for a shared identity’.115 As these quotes
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demonstrate, Japanese attempts to incorporate both ‘Asian’ and ‘universal’ values in a
common East Asian identity have been in vain and highlight a ﬁssure in Japan’s regional
vision in terms of establishing the values that should guide regional cooperation.
Japanese foreign-policy actors attempt to overcome this ﬁssure by stressing either ‘Asian’
or ‘universal’ values in diﬀerent contexts. In the case of functional cooperation in the
maritime security sphere, ‘Asian values’ of non-interference, non-use of force, consensus-
building and regional solutions to regional problems have guided Japanese eﬀorts,116
whereas Japan has adhered to ‘universal values’ in its promotion of the EAS and rejection
of the AIIB. Alternatively, Japanese foreign-policymakers try to incorporate the language of
‘universal’ and ‘Asian’ values in their discourse, only to end up emphasizing one set of
values over the other. For example, former Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko’s speech in
Phnom Penh in 2003 sought to combine functional economic cooperation along the lines
of the ‘ASEAN way’ with ‘universal’ values.117 Kawaguchi’s ‘Initiative for Reinforcing
ASEAN Integration’ echoed Japan’s long-standing foreign-policy goal to be a bridge
between Asia and the West and rested on the three pillars of ‘ﬁlling economic gaps and
enjoying prosperity’, ‘reassuring human dignity’, and ‘fostering democratic and stable
governance’.118 Her speech was peppered with phrases such as ‘mutual respect and under-
standing’, ‘ﬁll the economic gaps based on our ownership and partnership’, and ‘share the
prosperity and stability that our integrated community could produce’, formulations that
emphasized economic development through cooperation and were hoped to resonate with
her ASEAN audience.119 Japan’s engagement with ASEAN states has developed beyond its
traditional ODA policy to incorporate a discourse on democracy and human rights.
Nonetheless, economic development remains at the heart of Japan’s relations with
Southeast Asian states and in line with ‘Asian’ rather than ‘universal’ values.
Conclusion
Japan’s once seemingly unassailable position as ‘lead goose’ in the region has been
questioned because of the country’s decline in material power relative to China’s rise.
Japanese leaders have attempted to meet this challenge by encouraging the US to join
the EAS and by establishing strategic partnerships around the region. At the same time,
by perceiving Japan as a technological leader, Japanese actors still perceive their country
as a potential regional leader. In this sense the proverbial ‘goose’ is not yet cooked. The
problem lies in the incompatibility of the regional visions put forward by Japanese
foreign-policy makers. Japan’s regional vision is confused as policymakers simulta-
neously emphasize a ‘future-orientated’ approach to regional relations, positive aspects
of Japan’s past as a technological or ‘thought’ leader, open regionalism based on
functional cooperation, closed regionalism in the form of strategic partnerships, as
well as ‘universal’ and ‘Asian’ values. These policy approaches are unstable as they
advance discordant discursive positions along spatial, temporal, and ethical lines. From
a spatial standpoint, Japan’s embrace of open and closed regionalism demonstrates that
policymakers are yet to determine a clear sense of what the East Asian region actually is.
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The temporal dimension is captured in the problematic disjuncture between reassuring
Japan’s neighbors about its regional ambitions whilst articulating a ‘future-orientated’
approach that sidelines the negative aspects of Japan’s past and the conception of Japan
as a technological leader whose past triumphs must be remembered and endorsed.
Ethically, the mismatch between ‘universal’ and ‘Asian’ values, as well as Japan’s
rejection of China’s eﬀorts at functional cooperation in the region, continues to obscure
what Japanese policymakers think the East Asian region should stand for and which
norms of conduct should guide behavior. Because these visions are discordant, East
Asian actors have not accepted or internalized them and Japan has found it diﬃcult to
take the lead in regional institutions such as the EAS.
Much of the incompatibility between these regional worldviews can be explained by
how Japanese foreign-policy makers negotiate the spatial, temporal and ethical dimen-
sions of Japan’s identity. Japanese oﬃcials have embraced the notion of Japan as a
technological leader, but have diﬀerent ideas about what this entails, especially when it
comes to working with China. MOF oﬃcials have been far more receptive to open
regionalism and functional cooperation with China in the area of ﬁnance and have
even endorsed China’s AIIB initiative. Similarly, METI is more positive about East Asia-
focused trade initiatives such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership than
MOFA, which favors Asia-Paciﬁc trade initiatives.120 MOFA, predictably, has been far
more prone to US pressure, as the ministry has endeavored to maintain the US–Japan
alliance as the cornerstone of its foreign-policy. The Abe administration, together with
the MOD and MOFA, has emphasized closed regionalism through strategic partnerships
with key regional players in a bid to contain China. Even policymakers’ interpretations of
Japan’s future-orientated approach have diverged, with diﬀerent prime ministers adopt-
ing alternative approaches to addressing Japan’s past imperialism. As far as Japan’s
regional policy is concerned, the validity of Shinoda’s argument that a stronger Kantei
is forging a uniﬁed foreign-policy remains to be seen, as actors pursue divergent goals.
It could of course be argued that East Asia’s ‘complex institutional ecosystem’, which
requires Japanese actors to work through diﬀerent fora, limits the extent to which
Japanese foreign-policy makers can maintain a uniﬁed front and exercise
leadership,121making discursive ﬁssures along spatial, temporal and ethical lines inevi-
table. From this standpoint, actors can simply wait out the process of ‘institutional
Darwinism’ that will see the strongest and most relevant institutions survive.122 Such an
approach downplays the role of agency, however. Bureaucratic competition and the
mutual incompatibility of Japan’s regional worldviews matter. The absence of a uniﬁed
approach that clearly sets out where Japan stands on its past, present and future
regional roles has left Japan playing second ﬁddle to both ASEAN and the US within
the EAS. Backing the US in countering China’s AIIB initiative has resulted in Japan
being cut out from having any inﬂuence on a signiﬁcant emerging regional institution.
Forging a uniﬁed regional approach has to start with Japanese foreign-policy actors
engaging in an open and frank discussion on Japan’s imperialist past, for it is here that
the core Sino-Japanese relationship remains most contentious. Europe’s experience in
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confronting its past in the post-World War Two era was certainly diﬀerent from the
situation that East Asian states have faced, but the step-by-step approach taken by
Europe’s leaders can still inspire eﬀorts at reconciliation in East Asia. Focusing on those
measures that have encouraged reconciliation, including reiterating apologies, develop-
ing a joint history textbook, and participating in remembrance services, whilst refrain-
ing from oﬃcial visits to controversial sites such as Yasukuni Shrine, could open up the
possibility for enhanced regional understanding and cooperation. This would include a
more receptive approach towards Chinese initiatives, such as the AIIB, and avoiding
militarizing strategic partnerships. The agreement between Japanese policymakers over
their country’s ‘future-orientated’ approach to regional relations, coupled with an
entrenched sense of a China threat,123 makes it unlikely that Japan’s current foreign-
policy elite would pursue such a strategy.
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